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FEAR-MONGERING TORTS AND THE
EXAGGERATED DEATH OF DIVING
CARL T. BOGUS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The tort system is causing havoc, we are told. Skyrocketing
malpractice premiums are driving physicians from practice.'
Litigation is chilling the development of desperately needed new
medicines,2 enriching people who stupidly spill hot coffee on
themselves,3 and imposing a "tort tax" on consumer products that is
putting American companies at a competitive disadvantage in the
global economy.4 And the tort system is even squeezing the fun out of
everyday life. As Judge Edith H. Jones put it at this symposium's
conference at Vanderbilt University: "I would say, I think there have
been dramatic changes in behavior as a result of lawsuits. We can't
get hot coffee at McDonald's anymore. On playgrounds they don't
have seesaws, they don't have sliding boards, they don't have real
high swings that we used to enjoy. We don't have diving boards on
swimming pools; a lot of fun is taken out of life."5
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law
I. For example, President George W. Bush has stated: "One of the reasons people are
finding their premiums are up, and it's hard to find a doc these days, is because frivolous
and junk lawsuits are threatening medicine across the country. And there's a lot of them,
people filing these suits. I call them junk suits because they don't have any merit. The
problem is they cost money to fight." President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Baptist
Health Medical Center, Little Rock, Arkansas (January 25, 2004) (transcript on file with
the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy).
For a succinct explanation about why President Bush's claims are wrong, see Carl T.
Bogus, Research Counters Furor Over Malpractice Lawsuits, USA TODAY, March 24,
2004, at 13A. For a comprehensive treatment, see NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE,
DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995).
2. For analyses of some pharmaceutical cases and the impact they have on company
stock, see CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED
DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS AND THE COMMON LAW 6-17, 102-14 (2001).
3. For a discussion about myth versus reality in the infamous McDonald's hot coffee
case, see id. at 19-21.
4. For a discussion about myth versus reality regarding the "tort tax," see id. at 218-19.
5. Judge Edith H. Jones, Should Tort Law be a Form of Regulatory Law?: Remarks at
the Federalist Society Student Symposium (Feb. 20, 2004) (transcript on file with the
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy).
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It is easy to understand why Judge Jones believes the tort system is
taking the fun out of life. Claims that the tort system is driving the
diving board into oblivion have been made repeatedly by tort fear
mongers,6 journalists, and even scholars. The Washington Post, for
example, has reported:
Prompted initially by exponential increases in insurance rates and
liability exposure-and then, in many cases, an inability to find
coverage at any cost-public and private pools across the country
have closed their three-meter boards. Some also have taken down
one-meter boards, as well as slides, leaving only rafts, noodles,
and revetitious games of sharks and minnows as diversions in the
water.
Is it indeed true that the tort system is depriving us of the joy of
springing off diving boards? Does the tort system seek to ruthlessly
extinguish activities that involve any risk-even small risks that
provide more joy than pain-with crushing liability costs? Is the tort
system a mindless agent of the "nanny state"?
8
I have elsewhere made the bold claim that the tort system works so
well - among other things, because it benefits from so many self-
correcting mechanisms-that "while it can and occasionally does
produce wrong results, it is almost incapable of flatly irrational
results." 9
It was, therefore, no surprise to those who knew my work that I
expressed some dubiousness about Judge Jones's claims.10 However,
my co-panelist, Professor George L. Priest of Yale Law School,
declared:
I have looked at diving board injuries and Judge Jones is right.
6. Philip K. Howard sweeps with a broad brush as follows: "Visit a playground and
look for a seesaw. They are rapidly disappearing, going the way of merry-go-rounds,
diving boards, and other joys of childhood." Philip K. Howard, Lawsuits Are Drowning
America, USA TODAY MAGAZINE, March 1, 2003, at 20. In the very next sentence he
adds, incongruously, "No court ever held that seesaws are too dangerous, but who will
protect the school board if one youngster gets off too soon and the other child breaks an
ankle?" thereby suggesting that it is not lawsuits that are so much the problem as
unreasonable fear of lawsuits. It is an interesting admission coming from the chief tort
fear-monger. Id
7. Susan Levine, The Fall of the High Dive; Liability Concerns Prompt Pools to Scrap
the Beloved Three-Meter Board, WASH. POST, July 13, 2002, at B 1.
8. See, e.g., Ethan A. Nadelmann, An End to Marijuana Prohibition, NAT'L REV., July
12, 2004, at 28, 30 (suggesting that conservatives generally recoil at the "nanny state"
regulating what "adults can and cannot sell to one another"); P.J. O'Rourke, I Agree With
Me: When was the Last Time a Conservative Talk Show Changed a Mind?, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1, 2004, at 50, 53 (quoting fellow conservative Bill O'Reilly as saying
that, if Hillary Clinton becomes President, the United States will become a "nanny state").
9. BOGUS, supra note 2, at 4.
10. Jones, supra note 5, at 20.
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Diving boards have been removed from all public pools. The
leading diving board manufacturer, Duraflex, went out of business.
I talked to their officials and it was because of lawsuits. Prior to
the increase in lawsuits against the diving board manufacturers and
the diving board industry generally, there was no increase in
accidents related to diving boards. Actually, the number of diving
board accidents has been declining steadily since World War II
because diving boards were getting better and they were installing
them in better ways, but liability increased and companies went
out of business.
11
In the face of this authoritative onslaught, Judge Jones asked
whether I wanted to concede my position on diving boards.12 I
demurred, but promised to review what Professor Priest had written
and look at the area more closely.
This article is my report. I think the reader may find that the reality
is both more complicated-and far more sensible-than what we have
been led to believe.
II. DIVING BOARDS
A. Litigation
Litigation resulting from injuries involving swimming pools and
diving boards is not new, 13 not extensive, and--contrary to Professor
Priest's claim-not increasing. According to an exhaustive survey by
Professor Gregory S. Munro of the University of Montana School of
Law, 14 in the last half of the twentieth century there were a total of 52
reported case decisions involving diving boards in all courts in the
United States, both state and federal. 15 Professor Munro observes,
"[s]ome years the courts handed down no decisions involving diving
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 28.
13. See, e.g., Hammond v. Balboa Bay Club, 317 P.2d 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (noting
that during a time when a lifeguard at a private club absented himself in order to set up
beach umbrellas and therefore could not have warned of the impending danger, plaintiff
dived from a diving board and struck a swimmer); Cohen v. Suburban Sidney-Hill, Inc.,
178 N.E.2d 19 (Mass. 1961) (eight-year-old fell while climbing ladder to high diving
board); Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 440 A.2d 1085 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (plaintiff
alleged that injury occurred because diving board at residential pool extended from a
convex rather than a straight wall so that diver was unusually close to concrete coping and
that non-skid surface on board did not extend to and over edges of board).
14. Gregory S. Munro, The Case of the Disappearing Diving Boards: The Role of
Insurance in Prohibiting or Allowing Risk Taking in Society (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) [hereinafter Munro, Disappearing Diving Boards]. Professor Munro
generously shared the working draft of this paper with me, for which I am deeply grateful.
15. Professor Munro reviewed all appellate cases between 1949 and 1999. Id. at notes
76-77 and accompanying text.
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boards. In other years, the courts issued between one and three
decisions with no apparent pattern to the variation.' 16 Plaintiffs
obtained judgments in somewhere between 25 percent and 42 percent
of the cases reaching appeal. 17 The number of diving board cases
resulting in reported decisions may be a small fraction of the total
number filed. After all, something in the neighborhood of 95 percent
of civil cases are resolved before trial, and many that are tried to
conclusion do not result in reported decisions. Nevertheless, the small
and steady number of reported decisions strongly suggests that there
has not been an avalanche of such cases.
For reasons that will become clear shortly, the industry's trade
association, the National Spa & Pool Institute (NSPI), has become a
prime target of plaintiffs who were injured while diving into
swimming pools. Yet from approximately 1950 to 1990, NSPI has
been sued only 17 times, and a plaintiff won a judgment against NSPI
in only one case.'
8
Moreover, litigation has almost certainly decreased-indeed,
decreased dramatically-in proportion to swimming pools and diving
boards. Professor Munro reports that, over the past fifty years, the
number of swimming pools in the United States has increased from
10,800 to 2.3 million. 19 Thus, it appears that, over the past fifty years,
litigation has remained roughly constant while the number of
swimming pools has increased by a factor of more than 200. The ratio
of lawsuits to the industry's products-swimming pools and
accessories, including diving boards-has certainly shrunk
substantially. If the industry were robust enough to successfully
absorb litigation costs fifty years ago, it should be far better able to do
so today.
Yet, as Judge Jones and Professor Priest claim, diving boards are
16. Id. at text accompanying note 77. Generally, plaintiffs prevail in about 40 percent of
products liability cases. See BOGUS, supra note 2, at 90.
17. Of the 52 reported appellate cases, 13 affirmed a finding of liability and an
additional nine were remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Munro,
Disappearing Diving Boards, supra note 14, at text accompanying notes 77-78.
18. In re Nat'l Spa & Pool Inst., 257 B.R. 784, 791 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2001).
19. Munro, Disappearing Diving Boards, supra note 14, at note 78 and accompanying
text (citing Swimming Pool Data and Reference Annual from ROGER WARREN,
SWIMMING POOL MANAGEMENT (1985)). This counts the number of swimming pools, not
the number of swimming pools with diving boards, and suggests that in recent years the
fraction of swimming pools with diving boards has decreased. There are possible other
confounding factors as well. I do not know, for example, whether the ratios of claims to
cases filed or of cases filed to reported appellate cases have remained constant over this
period. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of pools is so enormous that, almost
certainly, litigation has declined in proportion to the number of diving boards in use.
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increasingly harder to find. If there are not fewer diving boards in use
in the United States today, there is a smaller percentage of swimming
pools with diving boards. One research firm reports that, over the past
five years, the percentage of swimming pools with diving boards has
declined from 50 percent to 38 percent.20 Litigation is blamed as the
villain, but if litigation has not increased, why are diving boards
disappearing?
Solving this mystery requires understanding something about the
underlying injuries, the history of litigation resulting from those
injuries, and the industry's response to injuries and litigation.
B. Injuries
Because we are focusing on diving boards, we need only concern
ourselves with injuries resulting from two causes: (1) diving from a
diving board and hitting the bottom of the swimming pool or, if the
board is on a pier or raft in open water, the bottom of the lake or
pond; and (2) diving from a diving board and hitting a swimmer.
Divers do, of course, sometimes leap into the air and hit the board
itself on the way down. These accidents can result in cuts, bruises,
and broken bones. But in the total scheme of things, these are
relatively minor injuries, and they seldom result in litigation.
The first category--divers who strike bottom-is -the most
significant. Too many of these accidents result in spinal cord injuries
(SCI) that leave the victim permanently paralyzed; half of these SCI
result in quadriplegia. 2'
Such accidents are surely as old as humanity itself. Long before
swimming pools or diving boards, people dived from cliffs or rocks
into oceans, lakes, ponds, and rivers, struck their head on the bottom,
and suffered spinal cord injuries. There is even the occasional
calamity that happens to someone performing a "run and plunge," that
is, running from the beach into open water and plunging headfirst into
the water. 2
2
Diving in shallow water is riskier than many people think. People
tend to underestimate the velocity and distance they will travel
20. See Amy Jo Brown, No Diving?, POOL & SPA NEWS, Jan. 30, 2004, 54, at 58
(reporting data compiled by P.K. Data of Duluth, GA).
21. See Munro, Disappearing Diving Boards, supra note 14, at note 44 and
accompanying text (reporting Richard S. Stone conclusion that half of diving SCI injuries
result in quadriplegia).
22. See, e.g., Leonard v. Pitstick Dairy & Park, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 467, 469 (I11. App. Ct.
1990) (involving a 15 year old who was rendered a quadriplegic after taking a "run and
plunge" into the shallow wading area of a lake).
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through water.23 They also mistakenly think that their arms, extended
out in front of them, will protect their head. But on the slimy and
slippery bottom, their arms often slide easily apart and their head
crashes, unprotected, into the bottom.
The National Spinal Cord Injury Statistical Center reports that 800
Americans are permanently paralyzed as a result of diving accidents
every year.24 This is about 7.3 percent of the 11,000 SCI occurring
from all causes in the United States. Diving accidents pale in
comparison to motor vehicle accidents, falls, and violence, which
respectively account for 50.4 percent, 23.8 percent, and 11.2 percent
of all SCI since 2000.26 But diving is the largest single cause of
sports-related SCI. By comparison, about forty football players from
all levels-including professional, college, and high school-sustain
SCI every year. 7
Hospitals do not routinely collect data about where or how diving
SCI occur. We do not, therefore, have exact counts about how many
diving SCI occur in swimming pools, as opposed to open water, or
how many calamitous dives were from diving boards, sides of
swimming pools, or from some object over open water. Nevertheless,
we can make some reasonable estimates. According to a large sample
survey by a researcher at the University of Alabama, 65 percent of all
diving SCI occur in open water and 35 percent in swimming pools.
2 8
An older study prepared for the swimming pool industry estimated the
split at 75 percent open water, 25 percent swimming pools. 9 Using
these two figures as bookends, we can estimate that between 200 and
280 SCI occur in swimming pools annually. A 2003 study
23. See Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208, 218 n.29, 224-
25 (Mich. 1992) (describing testimony by six experts, including industry consultant
Richard Stone).
24. Id. at 224. The data center name is now the National Spinal Cord Injury Statistical
Center. It is located at the University of Alabama.
25. National Spinal Cord Injury Statistical Center, Fact Sheet, Spinal Cord Injury:
Facts and Figures at a Glance (August 2004), available at
http://www.spinalcord.uab.edu/show.asp?durki=21446 [hereinafter NSCISC Fact Sheet].
26. Id.
27. Frank Raczkiewicz, Maroon Addresses NFL on Spinal Cord Injuries, available at
http://www.discover.pitt.edu/media/pcc01061I/Maroon.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2004)
(quoting Joseph C. Maroon, M.D., a professor in the Department of Neurological Surgery
at the University of Pittsburgh).
28. Michael DeVivo, Prevention of Spinal Cord Injuries that Occur in Swimming
Pools, Pushin' On Newsletter (Medical RRTC in Secondary Complications in SCI,
Birmingham, Ala.) (Winter 1997), at
http://www.spinalcord.uab.edu/show.asp?durki=21422.
29. This was the 1983 report by Richard Stone, a researcher at Arthur D. Little Co.,
who analyzed injury data for NSPI. See Brown, supra note 20, at 56 (stating that NSPI
hired Stone), 62 (concluding 75 percent of diving SCI occur in open water).
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commissioned by a diving board manufacturer estimated that
approximately 169 SCI result from dives into swimming pools.
30
Though this estimate is somewhat smaller, it is still in the same order
of magnitude.
However, not all diving accidents at swimming pools that result in
SCI occur from leaps off diving boards. In fact, only a fraction of
diving accidents appear to involve diving boards. As already noted,
only 38 percent of swimming pools today are equipped with diving
boards, and even when there is a diving board, people often dive from
the side of the pool. A recent industry study estimated that only 10.2
percent of the SCI at swimming pools resulted from diving off diving
boards rather than sides of pools. 31 Although the industry may have
reasons to downplay the number of SCI implicating diving boards, the
industry estimate of 10.2 percent is plausible. University of Alabama
researchers report that the majority of swimming pool SCI occurs in
shallow water, no more than four feet deep. 32 These are surely
unrelated to diving boards. By applying the 10.2 percent figure to the
range of estimates of all diving SCI at swimming pools, we can
reasonably estimate that about 17-28 people incur SCI as a result of
diving off boards at swimming pools in the United States annually.
That is a relatively small number in relation to all the people who
are diving into those two million swimming pools. Still, we cannot
dismiss this population, small as it may be, with a wave of the hand.
Each SCI is a cruel tragedy. Many of these accidents occur to young
people, who are imprisoned in wheelchairs for the rest of their lives.
We cannot comprehend the joys of life lost to them. A quadriplegic
will never again dance, play catch, strum a guitar, or take a stroll
around the block. Occupational dreams may be lost, and fundamental
human experiences such as sex, marriage, and parenthood may be
beyond reach. A compassionate society wants to reduce such injuries.
Society has economic reasons for wanting to reduce these injuries
as well. The social cost for every SCI is enormous. The hospital
charges alone-excluding even physician fees-averaged $192,414
for the initial stay in 1994. 33 The cost of health care and living
30. This was a 2003 study conducted by diving board manufacturer S.R. Smith. Brown,
supra note 20, at 62-63. Tom Masterson, President of S.R. Smith, Inc. of Rochelle Park,
NJ, confirmed commissioning the study but declined to furnish a copy of the study
because it contained propriety information that he did not want to share with competitors.
Telephone Interview with Tom Masterson (July 14, 2004).
31. The 2003 S.R. Smith study. Brown, supra note 20, at 63.
32. DeVivo, supra note 28.
33. Id.
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expenses for a quadriplegic is $682,957 for the first year and
$122,334 for each subsequent year.34 Life expectancies for persons
with SCI continue to increase. 35 Therefore, if each year twenty people
suffer SCI from diving board accidents, and their average age at the
time of the accident is 25, then the annual cost of caring for the 1,048
Americans who have suffered SCI in the past 53 years, and are still
alive today, is about $134 million.36
There is nothing complicated about why people suffer SCI from
diving from a board. The principal reason 37 is that the water was not
deep enough, and we shall deal with that at some length. The other
primary reason is divers crashing into swimmers. In one such
incident, for example, Scott Shropshire, a student at the University of
California at Davis, who was training to make the 2004 U.S. Olympic
diving team, performed a one and a half somersault from a diving
board and landed on top of a fifteen year old girl who was practicing
with a synchronized swimming team.38 The girl was bruised; Scott
was left quadriplegic. The accident happened at a public pool that
permitted "joint use," that is, the diving and swimming areas were not
separated by markers. The pool was confident that collisions between
divers and swimmers would not occur.39 None had happened before;
at least, none resulting in an injury serious enough to be called to the
pool's attention or to live in its institutional memory. And
presumably, chaos did not reign at the pool on this particular day.
Scott was working with the Diablo Divers team; the girl was working
with the Walnut Creek Aquanuts. Yet obviously such accidents do
occur.
With respect to the problem of hitting the bottom, the simple
question is: how deep does the water have to be for a diving board to
34. NSCISC Fact Sheet, supra note 25.
35. Id.
36. The life expectancy of a 25 year old is 53.4 years. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK
OF FACTS 2004, 76 (reporting 2001 data from the National Center for Health Statistics).
For the 20 people who sustained SCIs in the past year the hospital costs were $3.85
million and the cost of care was $12.5 million. NSCISC Fact Sheet, supra note 25. In
addition, there are 1,048 people still alive who experienced SCIs in the 52 previous years.
Id.
37. To my knowledge, there are no data revealing how many diving SCI occur from
hitting the bottom of the swimming pool rather than a hitting a swimmer (or other object
in the pool). My own survey of reported cases leads me to believe that SCI occur more
frequently from colliding with the bottom than with a swimmer.
38. Charlie Goodyear, Paralyzed Diver Wins $28 Million Judgment; Walnut Creek
HeldLiablefor Pool Accident, S.F. CHRON., May 6,2003, at Al.
39. See id (The article quoted an attorney for the City of Walnut Creek, California,
which owned the pool, as saying, "There was [sic] 16 or 17 years of joint use, and it
worked well. It gave everyone the maximum amount of pool time.")
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be reasonably safe? The higher the board, the deeper the water needs
to be, because divers reach greater velocities when descending from
greater heights, and the longer the deep water must extend because
higher boards also propel divers further. Standard board heights are
one meter and three meters above the water. Thus, we must ask how
deep the water has to be under boards of these heights to ensure
safety. The answer to "How deep?" has remained constant for at least
seventy years. Experts have mostly agreed that the minimum depth
for a one meter board needs to be nine to ten feet.40 The American
Red Cross, for example, recommends that diving boards be permitted
only when there is at least nine feet of water.4 '
Eleven or even twelve feet may be better. A margin of safety can
be important because sometimes the water level in a pool may be
lower than normal.42 Also, some diving boards have more spring and
can propel a diver higher than others. The YMCA of the USA
requires that, for a one meter diving board, a swimming pool be at
least eleven and a half feet deep.43 (The YMCA requires that water be
at least nine feet deep for diving from the deck of a pool. 44)
To refine this further, there must be an adequate "water envelope"
around the diver. What matters is not only how deep the water is
under the end of the diving board but, even more importantly, how
deep the water is several feet in front of the board where the diver
enters the water and how far deep water extends along the diver's
40. See Cummings v. Borough of Nazareth, 233 A.2d 874, 878-79 (Pa. 1967). In that
case: (1) An architect testified that the minimum depth requirement under a one meter
board was nine feet but that it was customary, in addition, to provide a further depression
or "well" under the board. (2) A swimming pool expert testified that prior to 1935 the
standard was nine feet and that after 1935 it was changed to eight to twelve feet,
depending on the type of pool. (3) The diving coach at Lafayette College, who had taught
water safety for many years, testified that prior to 1935 custom required a depth of eight
and one-half feet under a one-meter board but that after 1935 the standard increased to ten
feet. In a subsequent opinion, the court noted that the expert testimony offered by the
plaintiff was "symbolical of the objectivity of the plaintiff's case." The court further
indicated that additional expert testimony had been presented by the plaintiff at trial and
that the defendant neither challenged this testimony nor offered any competing expert
testimony of its own. Cummings v. Borough of Nazareth, 242 A.2d 460, 467 (Pa. 1968).
41. Fred Zeder, Industry Trade Association Hits Bottom, WASH. STATE TRIAL
LAWYERS ASS'N TRIAL NEWS (Nov. 1998), available at
http://www.pypfirm.comlarticles/industrytrade-association/. Zeder represented plaintiff
in the Meneely case. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., id (water level was five inches below normal on the day of the accident);
Pleasant v. Blue Mound Swim Club, 262 N.E.2d 107, 109-10 (I11. App. Ct. 1970) (water
level was twelve to sixteen inches lower than normal because the pool manager was
backflushing pool at time of accident).
43. ON THE GUARD II: THE YMCA LIFEGUARD MANUAL 85 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter
YMCA LIFEGUARD MANUAL].
44. Id. at 196.
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diagonal track through the water. The American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) has standards for a couple of slightly different
swimming pool configurations but, roughly speaking, ANSI's current
standards for a one meter board require that the water be at least eight
and a half feet under the end of the board and increase to a depth of
ten feet at ten feet out.45 A transition slope to shallower water
beginning at that point may not be steeper than a slope with a ratio of
one vertical foot for every three horizontal feet.
For a three meter board, ANSI requires that the water depth must
be at least eleven feet deep under the end of the board, twelve feet
deep twelve feet out, and not have a steeper transition slope than the
1:3 ratio.46
A responsible swimming pool industry would, therefore,
discourage equipping swimming pools with diving boards unless the
pool's deep end were at least ten feet, with deep water extending at
least ten feet from the tip of the board.
But, in fact, that is not what the industry did.
C. Industry's Response
In an effort to sell more swimming pools-particularly residential
pools during the rapid expansion of suburbia beginning in the
1950s-the industry looked for ways to cut comers, both literally and
figuratively. Literally, the industry cut off the comers of swimming
pools by designing "hopper bottom" pools. Instead of having a
rectangular bottom with straight walls, hopper bottoms have sloping
walls that converge in the middle. The diver jumps into a sort of
funnel. Straight out in front of the board is a deep point that may be
only two feet by two feet. From this center of the funnel the water
becomes shallower in all directions. The deepest point in some hopper
bottom pools is as shallow as 7.5 feet. A transition slope that starts to
rise from a floor only 7.5 feet deep becomes a potential collision wall.
Another similar design is the spoon-shaped pool, which differs from
the hopper bottom in that curved rather than straight walls converge
45. The reader will note that ANSI standards are less rigorous than YMCA
requirements. ANSI is supported by industry and its standards are often developed in
connection with industry trade association. ANSI standards for swimming pools were, at
least in the past, developed in connection with the National Spa & Pool Institute and
designated ANSI-NSPI standards. Current ANSI standards were promulgated in March
2003, and are more stringent than earlier iterations.
46. ANSI, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC SWIMMING POOLS, SPAS & SPECIAL
USE POOLS 2 (2003).
47. YMCA LIFEGUARD MANUAL, supra note 43, at 195.
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toward the middle.48
The industry's trade association, NSPI, promulgated standards for
these pools. But were these standards designed to ensure that
swimming pools equipped with diving boards were safe or designed
to provide manufacturers and installers with a legal shield from
injuries, a means of claiming they were not negligent because they
carefully adhered to NSPI standards?
In 1970, a teenage boy in Virginia hit his head on the transition
slope in a hopper-bottom pool and was rendered quadriplegic.49
Litigation ensued. The jury handed up a verdict of a cool $1 million
($4.82 million in 2004 dollars50 ). 51 What was significant, however,
was not so much the amount of the verdict; it was that an NSPI
official admitted in videotaped deposition testimony that NSPI
standards had no support in scientific testing.52 All of this was widely
reported in industry periodicals.
Something had to be done, or swimming pool builders and diving
board sellers would henceforth not be able to claim that they were
reasonably relying on NSPI standards. So NSPI looked for an expert
to validate its standards. NSPI first reviewed research already
underway by Milton Gabrielsen, an aquatics expert at Nova
University in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. But when NSPI learned that
Gabrielsen's research was already leading him to believe that NSPI
standards were flawed, it looked elsewhere for an expert to hire.53
NSPI commissioned the Arthur D. Little Company in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and the principal researcher attached to the project
was Richard Stone, a somewhat curious choice because he was a
nuclear physicist. 54 Stone ultimately produced a dozen reports for
NSPI. His very first report, produced in June 1974, concluded that the
hopper-bottom pools were not safe and that tall, athletic, young
males-who would jump the highest and farthest, and travel through
48. Id. at 196.
49. See Zeder, supra note 41. The case, Schutz v. Blue Dolphin, is unreported.
50. I obtained this figure by using the Consumer Price Index calculator offered online
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
http://minneapolisfed.org/Research/data/us/calc/index.cfm.
51. The case was settled for $450,000, reportedly because settlement was achieved just
moments before the jury announced its verdict. Zeder, supra note 41.
52. Id. In addition, NSPI subsequently knew that the Consumer Product Safety
Commission found that hopper bottom pools complying with NSPI standards were not
demonstrated to be safe. The industry vigorously, but unsuccessfully, challenged these
findings before they became final. See Zeder, supra note 41.
53. This is according to Merle Dowd, a former NSPI official. Id.
54. See id. (reporting Stone as a nuclear physicist); Brown, supra note 20, at 56
(reporting Stone worked for Arthur D. Little Co.).
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the water with the greatest velocity-were at particular risk.55
The industry needed a new defense, and it appears to have settled
on a classic: blaming the victim. The issue was reframed from "pools
were too shallow" to "people were not diving properly. 56 NSPI
instituted a campaign ostensibly designed to teach people how to dive
properly. Dubbed "Steer Up," the program-still featured on NSPI's
website57 -instructed people to keep their back arched, to keep their
arms extended over their head, and to "steer up" as they entered the
water.
The notion that a modest NSPI campaign would effectively educate
the American public about how to safely dive into shallow water is
absurd on its face. It would cost enormous sums of money to
effectively disseminate this message to everyone who swims and
dives and to continuously educate new crops of children in the
technique of shallow diving. NSPI surely never intended to undertake
a campaign of this magnitude.
Even more importantly, as NSPI officials must surely have known,
this particular task cannot be accomplished by an educational
campaign designed primarily to disseminate information. It takes
rigorous training to learn to reliably perform shallow dives. Consider
the story of Olivia Kahn.58 Olivia, 14, was a new member of her high
school junior varsity swim team.59 Her school had two swimming
pools-a deep pool for diving and water polo and a racing pool for
swimming. The racing pool was only 3.5 feet deep at both ends.6°
Most swimmers were expected to dive into the racing pool from
starting blocks eighteen inches above the water.6 1 (This apparently
satisfied National Federation of State High School Associations
guidelines, although the American Red Cross considered diving into
less than five feet of water dangerous under any circumstances. 62)
55. See Zeder, supra note 41; Brown, supra note 20, at 56.
56. In his second report, issued in 1980, Richard Stone advocated that industry "teach
and warn the public that diving without proper caution and training, whether it be in pools
or in the natural environment, involves risk of injury to the cervical spine." Brown, supra
note 20, at 56 (quoting 1980 Stone report).
57. Association of Pool and Spa Professionals, Plan Your Dive, Steer Up,
http://www.theapsp.org/ConsumerResources/Water+Safety+and+Health+Benefits/Plan+
Your+Dive+Steer+Up+-+Part+l.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
58. See Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist., 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003).
59. Id. at 32.
60. Id. at 33.
61. One team member starts inside the pool; three dive from the starting block. Id. at
33-34.
62. Id. at 34.
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The team practiced twice per week. The coach testified that first,
using the deep pool, he gave Olivia about four separate training
sessions in shallow diving technique.63 He remembered observing
Olivia dive five to ten times during one of these sessions alone. After
he believed she was ready, he switched Olivia's training to the racing
pool. He recalled watching her dive from the deck of the racing pool
about five times at one or perhaps two practices, and also recalled her
diving from the starting block at least once. After all of this training,
Olivia did not feel confident diving from the starting blocks into the
racing pool. An assistant coach agreed; she thought Olivia needed
more practice.64 Teammates remarked that Olivia was going too deep.
Nevertheless, the coach considered Olivia proficient enough such
that-notwithstanding Olivia's own pleas that she was not ready-
shortly before the event was to begin he directed her to participate in
a race that required her diving from the starting block into the racing
pool. Two teammates offered to give Olivia additional last minute
training. They demonstrated the diving technique and watched Olivia
perform two practice dives. On her third practice dive, Olivia broke
her neck.65
The American Red Cross safety manual emphasizes how difficult it
is to internalize shallow diving techniques. "Even an experienced
66diver can be seriously injured by diving improperly," it cautions.
Coaches should not allow anyone to dive into a racing pool until, by
observed practice in deep water, the swimmer has "consistently
established" the ability to avoid penetrating the water below two and
half feet.67 The literature is replete with examples of experienced but
not professionally-trained divers who thought they could execute
some sort of shallow dive and had done so many times before yet, on
a fateful occasion, for reasons even they could not explain, mistakenly
dived too deep.68
In view of how much rigorous training it actually takes to reliably
make shallow dives, it is difficult to take NSPI's "Steer Up"
campaign at face value. Such a campaign is likely to cause more harm
than good by lulling people into believing that, having been told to
arch their back and steer up, they can safely perform shallow dives.
63. Id. at 35.
64. Id. at 34.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 34 (quoting manual).
67. Id. (quoting manual).
68. See, e.g., Corbin v. Coleco Indus., 748 F.2d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating
plaintiff intended to do a belly flop but "for some reason" entered the water head first).
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The true value of the campaign is that it supports arguments that
people injure themselves by diving improperly. If you crash into the
bottom, it's your own fault; you should have arched your back and
steered up. In liability terms, the victim misused the swimming pool
by diving too deeply. He assumed the risk by not diving properly.
According to one of the industry's key strategists, the strategy was
successful. Writing in an industry publication, he said:
Although a relatively small number of people continue to suffer
spinal-cord injuries from diving into swimming pools, it is a fact
that the cause of these injuries is attributed by an increasing
number of courts to the action of the individual diver....
A U.S. District Court judge in Kansas said as much earlier this
year, in dismissing a diving-injury lawsuit. It was not a failure to
wam that caused plaintiffs injury, he said; what caused the injury
was plaintiffs decision to dive headfirst into obviously shallow
water.
69
"[P]ools are always safe for their intended use," he adds. 70
Serving its member manufacturers and installers, NSPI continued
to approve standards purporting to match various diving boards with
swimming pools. For example, NSPI approved the S.R. Smith 606
and 808 diving boards for NSPI Type II hopper bottom pools. 71 On
October 26, 1982, Robert Weiner, a consultant for NSPI, sent NSPI a
letter stating that his tests revealed that those boards presented serious
risks of SCI when used on Type II pools. 72 He said that the boards
were launching divers on trajectories that caused them to enter the
water at greater velocities and farther from the board's tip than other
boards. Weiner recommended that NSPI stop approving these diving
boards on Type II pools; he also asked NSPI to inform S.R. Smith of
his test results and recommendations. NSPI did neither.
69. Richard W. Cohen, Who's Really Responsible for Diving Accidents?, AQUA, Sept.
1991, at 12.
70. Id. at 14. Cohen goes on to suggest that although they do not prevent injuries,
warning labels are a useful adjunct to the blame-the-victim theme. He writes:
There is an important value in the industry's commitment to warning messages,
even though warnings do not prevent quadriplegic injuries in swimming pools.
As every parent of teenagers knows from experience, warnings of the possible
consequences of risk-prone behavior seldom deters the intended activity.
Id.
71. Zeder, supra note 41; Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49, 51 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000), appeal denied, 21 P.3d 290 (Wash. 2001).
72. Zeder, supra note 41.
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D. Disclosure
It is generally acknowledged7 3 that the single case that has had the
greatest impact on the industry involved sixteen-year-old Shawn
Meneely's fateful dive in 1991.74 Shawn, a high school honor student,
was spending the day with a classmate.75 The two boys were invited
to the home of John Williamson, the classmate's grandfather, in
Kennewick, Washington. Williamson had an NSPI Type II hopper
bottom swimming pool, which was 7'9" deep at its deepest point.
76
The pool had been installed in 1965; in 1974, Williamson replaced the
original diving board with an S.R. Smith 606.77 The board carried a
label stating it had been approved by NSPI for Type II pools.
78
The two boys were asked to supervise two younger cousins in the
early afternoon, during which time the two older boys gave their
cousins swimming lessons in the shallow end of the pool.79 Late in the
afternoon, Shawn and his friend were allowed to use the pool by
themselves. As kids will do, the two boys vied for who could make
the biggest splash by doing cannonballs from the diving board. After
a few such dives, Shawn jumped off the board headfirst with his arms
and legs extended, intending to produce a large splash, but at the last
moment he pulled his arms and legs into his body, entering the water
in what is sometimes referred to as a "sailor's dive." 80 Shawn hit his
head on the transition slope and was rendered quadriplegic.
The jury handed up an eleven million dollar verdict, apportioning
responsibility at sixty percent to NSPI, thirty percent to S.R Smith,
and ten percent to the diving board installer.81 The money itself was
significant. Based on this judgment alone, NSPI filed for
73. See, e.g., Kenneth Bredemeier, Rules or Advice? Pool-Safety Cases Target Trade
Group, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2002, at El; Brown, supra note 20 (both suggesting the
Meneely case had a large impact on the industry).
74. Meneely, 5 P.3dat 51.
75. Zeder, supra note 41.
76. Meneely, 5 P.3d at 52.
77. Id. There was some dispute whether John Williamson's pool was a Type II pool. At
its deepest point it was three inches deeper than a standard Type II pool. However, it was
shorter (19' rather than 22') from the end of the pool to the top of the transition slope, and
the transition slope was steeper (2:1 rather than 3:1 rise) than the standard Type II.
Plaintiffs' experts testified that the pool in question was within practical limits the same as
a Type II pool, and that the transition slope of the Williamson pool matched that of a Type
II pool at the point where Shawn hit his head. Id. at 52.
78. Id. at 51-52.
79. Id. at 52.
80. Telephone Interview with Tom Masterson, President of §.R. Smith, Inc. (June 29,
2004) (describing this as a "sailor's dive").
81. Zeder, supra note 41.
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reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy laws. 82
Even more significant was the disclosure. Through discovery, the
plaintiff's attorney learned that NSPI had long known that hopper
bottom pools complying with its standards were unsafe and that the
S.R. Smith 606 diving board was unsafe for such pools. 83 Because
this case went to trial and the evidence was presented in a public
courtroom, rather than being suppressed by a confidentiality covenant
in a settlement agreement, the evidence became public for the first
time.
Although the industry's campaign to blame the victim is running
into difficulty, it still makes the attempt. Here, for example, is part of
an interview that an industry publication conducted with Shawn
Meneely in 2001 (when Shawn was 25 years old):
Q. Do you remember the accident vividly? Were you surprised by
the results of the horseplay that was going on?
A. I don't think I'd call it horseplay. We were just doing regular
kid stuff. Yeah, I was totally shocked. Who thinks they are going
to get hurt in a swimming pool, ya know.
84
It is not sensible to maintain that swimming pools are safe only
when divers have the same degree of training and skill and take the
same degree of care as, say, parachutists. As courts have long since
held, the presence of a diving board is an invitation to dive.85 People
reasonably assume that the water is sufficiently deep such that they
will not risk permanent paralysis by diving from a board that was
placed there for the very purpose of diving into the pool. Is a diving
board reasonably safe if the diver must hit the center of an imaginary
bull's-eye in the water? Does it make sense to argue that divers
assume the risk of quadriplegia if they jump too far, or not far
enough, or land to the right or left of an imaginary midline, or fail to
execute a shallow dive?
The Meneely case, with its accompanying revelations, panicked the
industry. The case was featured on the CBS newsmagazine 60
82. In re Nat'l Spa & Pool Inst, supra note 18, at 785.
83. See notes 47-72 and accompanying text. NSPI also knew that the Consumer
Product Safety Commission had determined that hopper bottom pools complying with
NSPI standards were not demonstrated to be safe. The industry vigorously, but
unsuccessfully, challenged these findings before they became final. See Zeder, supra note
41.
84. Aqua Asks Shawn Meneely, AQUA, March 2001, at 16.
85. See, e.g., Chauvin v. Atlas Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 581, 584 (La. Ct. App. 1964);
Brown v. Hayden Island Amusement Co., 378 P.2d 953, 958 (Or. 1963) (both stating a
diving board is an "invitation to dive").
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Minutes. This was the third time that a national television broadcast
had focused on the danger of diving boards and paralysis; pre-
Meneely stories had been done on ABC's 20/20 and the syndicated
program Inside Edition. What was different this time was that it was
revealed that the industry deliberately concealed the danger of diving
into shallow pools-indeed, that it knowingly created the danger by
promoting shallow pools and representing them to be safe for diving.
The industry had reason to be concerned. In all probability, only a
tiny fraction of the 17-28 people 86 who suffer SCI as a result of diving
board accidents was filing lawsuits.8 7 What if the publicity, combined
with the revelation that the industry knowingly and deliberately
promoted swimming pools unsafe for diving, drove up the number of
lawsuits?
Two questions remain: (1) What impact has litigation had on diving
boards?; and (2) Has that impact been socially beneficial or
deleterious?
III. THE EXAGGERATED DEATH OF DIVING
As previously noted, one research firm says that the percentage of
swimming pools with diving boards in the United States has declined
from 50 percent to 38 percent. 88 I do not know whether this figure is
accurate. I do not know how the figure was derived and am not aware
of any other information that confirms or disputes it. But even
assuming its accuracy, the figure tells us very little. To evaluate what
impact litigation has had on diving, we must know exactly where, and
why, that reduction is taking place. Have diving boards been removed
from pools less than eleven feet deep but remained at deeper pools?
Are new pools not being equipped with diving boards because
liability insurance is too expensive or because constructing a
sufficiently deep pool is too expensive? If a deep pool does not have a
diving board, is it because the insurance was prohibitive or because
the owners did not want to dedicate a portion of the pool to diving?
This is a subject on which people have long leapt to conclusions
86. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
87. See Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability
"Revolution ": Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONZ. L. REV.
251, 258 (1991-92) (reviewing various studies that show that only a tiny fraction of people
who are injured-e.g., three percent of people who are injured in non-work, non-
automobile settings-file lawsuits). Moreover, the data we have about the numbers of
lawsuits filed, though not definitive, suggests the number of lawsuits is less than the
number of diving SCI. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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based on rumor, gossip, or limited personal observation. For example,
in 1987 Professor Priest wrote in one article that "diving boards have
been removed from school swimming pools, '89 and in a second article
asserted that "diving boards removed from city schools have not been
replaced." 90 Professor Priest cites a single source for both statements:
a 1986 report by an advisory commission to the governor of New
York State.91
That report deals with insurance and the alleged torts crisis
generally; it mentions swimming pools in passing several times, never
with more than a phrase or single sentence at a time. Professor Priest
cites two separate pages in the report. One page contains the sweeping
statement that "diving boards in New York City schools are no longer
in use. ',92 The other statement laments, in nearly hysterical terms, that
"[flunctional unavailability . . . is clearly present in endemic
proportions with respect to important forms of risk, many of them
associated with public activities, 93 and goes on to list a disturbing
number of such activities that are presumably no longer available (or
are functionally unavailable, if that is different) including "some ski
slopes, swimming pools with active diving boards, amusement parks,
gymnasiums containing trampolines, etc."94
At neither spot does the Commission cite its source for the
proposition that diving boards-either all or some, the report appears
inconsistent-have been removed from swimming pools at New York
City schools. The Commission, however, refers to its source
elsewhere: "The fact that, we are told, the diving boards in New York
City schools cannot now be used because of liability cost concerns is
emblematic of ... socially useful but legally vulnerable activities."
95
We are told? That seems emblematic of the foundation of so many of
the hyperbolic claims regarding disappearing diving boards.96
89. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1522 (1987).
90. George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 497 (1987).
91. STATE OF NEW YORK, INSURING OUR FUTURE: REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE (April 7, 1986).
92. Id. at 15.
93. Id. at 23.
94. Id. at 24.
95. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
96. Were diving boards removed as a result of a policy promulgated by the school
department? One might expect that, if so, the Commission would obtain the written
directive calling for the removal of diving boards and investigate the reasons for it. Was it
because of insurance, the realization that the pools were not deep enough for diving,
concerns about adequate supervision and mixed use, or a budgetary decision to lay off
diving instructors and discontinue diving competitions?
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I am not sure to what extent diving boards have been removed from
America's pools-public or residential-but I am now reasonably
sure that no one knows. Here are a few things that I do know:
0 The president of diving board manufacturer S.R. Smith Inc.
tells me that his company's sales have increased every year for the
past five years.
97
0 The president of Inter-Fab Incorporated, the other main
manufacturer of residential diving boards, tells me that Inter-Fab's
98diving board sales are strong but not growing.
* The executive vice president of Duraflex International
Corporation (the company that Professor Priest thought went out of
business because of liability, and the primary manufacturer of
competitive diving boards) tells me that her company is alive, well,
and thriving, and that its sales have increased by five to ten percent
every year since 1957. She says while Duraflex has never gone out of
business, in 1968 it made a business decision to gradually withdraw
from the residential diving board market because it believed "the
residential market was a source of potential problems because most
home pools are too small." She says no case forced the company's
hand. It phased out from this market over a ten year period. When I
asked her whether diving boards have been eliminated from high
schools or colleges, she told me that Duraflex is shipping diving
boards to both high schools and colleges every week. She told me
that, about ten years ago, the company's sales to high schools in Iowa
declined dramatically because, she believes, "Iowa revised their codes
for dimensions for diving safety, and most high school pools and
municipal pools did not meet the new standards." However, she says
"sales to Iowa appear to have recovered, perhaps due to new
construction of deeper pools." She is not aware of any sweeping
discontinuance of diving in public pools, high school, or colleges
elsewhere. Overall, Duraflex's sales of diving boards have been stable
over many years, ranging between 1,200 and 1,400 annually.99
* The president of United States Diving, Inc., the national
association of diving clubs, coaches, and athletes, tells me that over
the past three years, the number of member clubs has declined from
97. Telephone Interview with Tom Masterson, supra note 80.
98. Telephone Interview with Michael Hagerty, President, Inter-Fab Incorporated (July
22, 2004).
99. Telephone Interview with Jan Rude, Executive Vice President, Duraflex
International Corporation (July 22, 2004), supplemented by e-mail messages of the same
date (on file with author).
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315 to 285 and there has been a corresponding drop in the numbers of
coach and athlete members. He attributes the drop to the economy.
100
The person who handled my inquiry at the Men's Swimming
and Diving program at the University of Michigan informs me that
the University of Michigan maintains diving boards (one meter and
three meter, plus a ten meter platform) at a diving well, that is, a pool
used exclusively for diving. He advised that all Big Ten universities
except the University of Illinois have swimming and diving programs
that include diving.l0l
0 The only public swimming pools in my town (which has a
beach on Narragansett Bay) are at the YMCA. When I asked the
director of aquatics why those pools do not have diving boards, he
told me it is because they are not 11 '6" deep.
10 2
* The YMCA's representative to the board of directors of United
States Diving tells me he believes the YMCA standards are too
stringent, and as a result diving boards have been unnecessarily
removed from many existing YMCA swimming pools.1
0 3
0 The NCAA Diving Chairman tells me that "diving is
flourishing.... Anytime a community pool is built, diving boards
(mostly 1 meter) are added." He notes that diving boards are
sometimes omitted from pools built for private use, such as YMCA's
and country clubs', but believes that is "mostly due to a lack of funds,
not risk of injury. 10 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Is litigation the death of diving? Almost certainly not. Paraphrasing
Mark Twain,10 5 reports of the death of diving have been grossly
100. Telephone Interview with Todd Smith, Executive Director, United States Diving
(July 21, 2004).
101. Telephone Interview with Paul Dickerson, Media Contact for Men's Swimming
and Diving, University of Michigan (July 20, 2004).
102. Interview with Chris Silman, Head of Aquatics, East Bay (Rhode Island) YMCA
(July 16, 2004).
103. E-mail message from Donald Leas, International Chair for Diving of World
International Games, Director of Diving Competitions for YMCA-USA, and YMCA-
USA's representative to United States Diving's board of directors (July 21, 2004) (on file
with author).
104. E-mail message from Kevin Lawrence, University of North Carolina Diving
Coach and NCAA Diving Chairman (July 21, 2004) (on file with author).
105. When Mark Twain was visiting a cousin in London, he became ill. A newspaper
reporter informed Twain that a New York newspaper had reported he had died and asked
Twain whether he wanted to respond. Twain answered, "Say the report is exaggerated."
Mark Twain, The Report of My Death (Apr. 3, 1906), in MARK TWAIN IN ERUPTION 252-
53 (Bernard De Voto ed., 1940).
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exaggerated.
Litigation has reduced the percentage of swimming pools that are
equipped with diving boards, but in the main that is surely for the
good. Many, and probably most, of the pools from which diving
boards have been removed are simply too small for safe diving. In
other instances, diving boards have probably been removed from
some public pools of sufficient depths because the facility has decided
it did not want to dedicate a portion of the pool for diving and thought
mixed use too risky. The removal of these boards will reduce the
number of tragic SCI injuries and perhaps some fatalities. 10 6 Will
some fun be eliminated as well? Of course it will. But it is difficult to
argue that the trade-off-less fun for fewer SCI-is unreasonable.
How many dives add up to the joy that is lost over a lifetime by a
young person suffering a spinal cord injury?
Undoubtedly, there is confusion about the risks of diving, and
boards have probably been removed from adequately deep pools at
the demand of insurance underwriters or facility directors who
mistakenly have the impression that diving is inherently risky. The
confusion is exacerbated by the industry itself, which muddies the
water by blaming the victim.
Confusion is also being sown by tort-mongers who promote the
myth that the tort system is mindlessly imposing liability on diving
boards. What we need is clarity about the real risks of diving, so that
we can have diving boards where it is safe to dive.
The next time Judge Edith Jones walks to the head of a swimming
pool and finds that the diving board is gone, she ought to check the
depth. If she finds plenty of water and the diving board has been
removed for no good reason, she ought to blame not the tort lawyers,
but the tort fear-mongers.
106. Someone experiencing an SCI in the water will drown unless rescued. Someone
who experiences an SCI at the bottom of a swimming pool cannot call for help and will
drown unless others notice his dilemma.
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